ALIENABLE-INALIENABLE POSSESSION DISTINCTIONS: FROM SYNTAX TO SEMANTICS

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ABSTRACT

This paper looks at the variant linguistic forms used by natural language to express alienable-inalienable distinctions. Frameworks such as those provided by Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar assume that notions like ownership, kinship, and whole/part relationships are, like all other units of language, conceptual structures on par with lexical items. They are fundamental aspects of everyday experience which are cognitively basic. However, as we demonstrate in this paper, such a theory encounters many problems in the face of copious kinds of possessive expressions found in natural languages. Not only do we find different structures for the same possession relation in any given language, but possessive expressions are often exploited by a language to denote even non-possessive relations, such as emotive states of hunger, anger and pain.

Most importantly however, these forms show syntactic peculiarities which are unexpected and hence left unexplained in a Cognitive Grammar framework. We are of the opinion that syntax of possession cannot be overlooked while analyzing alienable-inalienable differences. To substantiate our claim, we look very closely at the Hindi postposition ‘paas’ (near) to understand its semantic contribution in alienable constructions. Our study shows that the postposition, unlike what may appear at first glance, does not contribute a locational meaning to alienable possession. It behaves more like a linker establishing a relation between two NPs.

Our study contends that a fruitful study of semantics is possible only when, in addition to a deeper understanding of the way our mind conceptualizes the world, we also take into account the role of syntactic structures in meaning formation. This paper can therefore be rightly considered as a defense of Chomsky’s syntactico-centric approach to meaning.

This paper looks at the syntax and semantics of possession in natural language. The major goals of this paper are: to examine certain syntactic peculiarities in natural language expressions for possession that cannot be understood by just looking at cognitive prototypes and schemas; to investigate the contribution of individual discrete elements to the semantics of possessive constructions; and finally to provide a syntactic account of the semantics of alienable and inalienable possession and part-whole relations in the Hindi language.

I. Introduction

As Jackendoff (2002) correctly points out, “Meaning is the “holy grail” not only of linguistics, but also of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience – not to mention more distant domains such as cultural and literary theory” Understanding how we mean and how we think are vital issues for our intuitive sense of ourselves as human beings” (267). Meaning is perhaps one of the most widely sought after and yet never fully attainable goals of various disciplines, more so for linguistics. Most of the major wars in the discipline have been fought and divisions made on questions of semantics and its alleged dependence on grammatical/syntactic structures.

Generative Grammar, as many see it today, other than some short stints in the 1960s in works like Aspects (Chomsky 1965) has generally been silent, at best ambivalent, on semantic related issues. A typical criticism leveled against this formalist approach concerns the ‘syntactocentric'
approach that it takes to natural language in general and to semantics in particular. Semantics, though not particularly dismissed in such an approach, has been assumed to be read off either directly or indirectly (via covert transformations) the grammatical structures at LF, the interface between the narrow syntactic component and the Conceptual-Intentional System.

Such a view hasn’t gone very well with many, as one can see from the numerous alternatives that have emerged in response to Chomsky’s theory (such as Lakoff’s 1971 Generative Semantics, Jackendoff’s 2002 Conceptual Semantics, Langacker’s 1987, 2008 Cognitive Grammar, Talmy’s 2000 Cognitive Semantics among others). Though different in their approaches, what binds these approaches, specifically the last three, together is their contention that syntactic compositionality does not bear directly on the interpretation of expressions.

Our attempt in this paper is to present a brief review of some of the available non-generative literature, especially Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar on possession and, see if syntax can be completely undermined in interpreting these structures. First of all, we scan through his analysis of possession in section two and then proceed to section three to illustrate that there are certain syntactic peculiarities in natural language expressions for possession that cannot be done away with by just looking at cognitive prototypes and schemas. This, we believe, is where a grammarian’s task begins; to explain any gaps that we may find in the paradigm by investigating the contribution of individual discrete elements to the semantics of entire phrases. Section four is accordingly carved to provide a syntactic explanation of the semantics of alienable and inalienable possession and part-whole relations in Hindi ¹. We specifically focus our attention on the postposition/particle paas ‘near’ in these constructions and try to gauge the semantic contribution of these syntactic units. Our contention is that these particles are linkers that serve to relate two noun phrases. In the absence of a linker particle, overt verbal agreement between the two, via genitive case on the possessor, must serve to link the two. Section five concludes our discussion.

2. Possession in Symbolic Language

Among many accounts of how language structure is shaped by cognitive measures, Langacker's work stands out in assuming that all language structure is inherently symbolic, “above and beyond the symbolic relations embodied in the lexical items they employ” (Langacker 1987: 12). All grammatical categories (noun, verb, preposition, etc.), morphemes (the, -ed, -s, etc.) and rules (e.g. plural formation) are conceptual structures on a par with lexical items. The notion of a 'grammatical subject' for instance, is related to the cognitive concept 'trajector' that in turn emanates from our capability to focus and shift attention.

The semantic characterization of an expression is achieved at two levels: the prototype level and the schema level. While the prototype is based on an experientially grounded conceptual archetype, the schematic characterization invokes a basic cognitive ability which is immanent in the archetype.

For Langacker, “[i]t seems fairly evident that ownership, kinship, and whole/part relationships are prototypical for possessive constructions, with ownership arguably being more central than the others (Taylor 1996). These are the kinds of notions I identify as conceptual archetypes – fundamental aspects of everyday experience which are cognitively basic and apprehended as gestalts despite their analytic complexity. The term possession reflects the archetype of ownership (82)”.

A schematic description, on the other hand, is achieved in terms of the reference point ability, which is our capacity to mentally access one entity by means of another. The conceptualizer (C) locates the entity serving as reference point (R) which has as its dominion (D) a set of associated
entities, one of which is the target (T). A reference point relation is sequenced mental access starting from R and ultimately leading to T.

For Langacker, “[s]ince the reference point ability is independent of any particular conceptual content, it is sufficiently abstract and flexible to accommodate the full range of possessive expressions. At the same time, it is inherently asymmetrical, thus accounting for the typical irreversibility of possessive relationships. It therefore seems reasonable as a schematic characterization of possessives (82)”.

3. Langacker's Framework and Syntax

It is tempting to believe with Langacker that a syntax-free account is possible for possessive structures in world's languages. The structural organization of possessives derives directly from the way we schematize the relevant relation and create prototypes. However, a closer cross-linguistic investigation of possessive structures contests the gestalt-like view of language. Relevant empirical data attesting to this claim is provided below.

Possessive relations can, but need not be expressed only through possessive structures like X's Y (1a), or Y of X's (1b), Y has Y (1c), or X's Y exists (1d).

(1) a. John's sister
   b. A sister of John's
   c. John has a house
   d. Mary John ki behen he
      Mary John's sister be
      'Mary is John's sister.'

Possession can be also adeptly expressed by structures like the following (2).

(2) a. John with a car
   b. ek haath-wala aadmii
      one hand with man
      'A man with one hand'

Langacker's framework explains certain typical possessive structures (ownership, kinship terms etc. as in 'John has a car' or others mentioned above) with reference to prototypes and schemas. But whether structures lacking the possessive morpheme '-s' or preposition 'of', but nonetheless, denoting possession of some sort is to be explained with reference to cognitive abilities and processes has been left unclear in his framework. The 'multiple forms-same meaning' question is left unanswered here and there is no way to explain how to get to these varied forms from the same cognitive schema. In other words, his framework has no way to account for why the same language should allow varied forms to refer to one and the same domain of our knowledge system.

Further, what makes our task more challenging is the presence of similar forms but with different semantics within the same language (e.g. English) as well as across languages (e.g. Spanish), as one may attest from the English and Spanish examples in (3-8).

(3) John has lots of shame.
(4) John tiene vergüenza.
   John has shame.
(5) John has a cold.
(6) John tiene frío.
   John has cold.
(7) John has knowledge about it.
(8) John tiene impresión.

These examples from English and Spanish allow the same type of possessive constructions to denote emotional states (3, 4), physical states (5, 6) and mental states (7, 8). Clearly, these structures do not implicate any kind of ownership or possession that John's being ashamed should imply that John X has shame Y in its dominion and referring to X would help us narrow down to Y. Obviously, these phrases are not at par with ownership, kinship or even part-whole terms. Langacker's claim that we have to assume that they are all alike when it comes to our cognition seems off the line.

Perhaps, one could claim that these states could be viewed as parts contained within us as wholes; i.e. we cognize them as being related to each other as parts to the whole of a part-whole relationship. But as Uriagereka suspects, if that were to be the case, then “every term can be relational”, especially when we get into the domain of part-whole relationships. What then is not related to something else or is not part of something else? He is also right to add that, “[i]t is also tempting to think that just about any relation between two entities can be expressed as a possession. This, however, is false. I relate to you right now, but it makes no sense to say “I have you.” Numbers relate to each other, in a sense inalienably; yet what does it mean that 3 has 1.2.”

Similarly, reverses of relations are odd, but not completely out in every language and yet there are constraints which a simple gestalt-like linguistic theory will be unable to explain. Consider the following examples from (9-14) from Uriagereka:

(9) The poor neighborhoods of the city.
(10) The city's poor neighborhoods.
(11) The city has poor neighborhoods
(12) A city of poor neighborhoods
(13) *The/a poor neighborhoods' city
(14) The poor neighborhoods are the city's

Given that relations and their inverses are possible in some cases, it is necessary that Langacker's cognitive schemas are allowed enough flexibility to change the T, in relation to R and its dominion D. Otherwise these examples are left unaccounted for in his framework. Another problem that cannot be easily explained away in his framework is the unacceptability of structures like (13) that disallow the ex-possessee turned possessor to appear with determiners, whether they are definite or non-definite. If cognitive schemas are incapable of explaining these facts, then surely the answer must be sought somewhere else, possibly in the syntactic structure of the possessive (see Uriagereka 1998 for a possible solution).

We feel that the job of a syntactician begins here: to highlight those traits in the language that cannot be explained by a mere reference to cognitive schemas. We must provide explanations by looking more closely at the contribution of individual elements to the semantics of the entire phrase. That is what we precisely try to do here with the alienable/inalienable possessive structure contrasts in Hindi.

Hindi expresses its alienable objects with a distinct postposition (P) that is unavailable to inalienable objects. Consider the following examples in (15-18).

(15) John ke paas ek gaaRi he
John's P one car be
(16) ?John ki ek gaaRi he
   John's one car be
   'John has a car.'

(17) *Johnke paas ek bhaai he
John's P one brother be
(18) John kaa ek bhaai he
John's P one brother be
   'John has a brother.'

One of the immediate questions before us is why alienable possession should be marked with a separate postposition like paas/'near'. Even if our cognition were such that alienable objects, in contrast to inalienable objects or part-whole relations are marked out as separate from each other (i.e. the intersection of R and T would amount to an empty set), it is not clear why a postposition and not some other item would be inserted in the structure, i.e. what could be so unique about postpositions that they are used in alienable possessive structures in Hindi. Moreover, if it were just a matter with our cognition, the expectation would be that all languages employ the same technique for alienable possession representation. However, that is not true, as one can see from the English example below in (19).

(19) I have a car.

Moreover, it is also not true that prepositions or postpositions are always out for inalienable relations, as we can see from the examples in (20) and (21) from Bantu, where the presence of a prepositional element is not contingent on the kind of possessive relation the structure expresses.iii There are prepositional elements (though with different forms 'ya' and 'wa') attached to the possessors in both instances.

(20) Tadala a-na-thyol-a ndodo ya-mwana
   Tadala SM-PST-break-FV stick assoc-child
   'Tadala broke the child's stick.'

(21) Mphatso a-na-thyol-a mwendo wa-mwana
   Mphasto SM-PST-break-FV leg assoc-child
   'Mphasto broke the child's leg.'

But the alienable/inalienable distinction through postposition addition is not unique to Hindi. We find similar phenomenon in Bangla, Marathi and a host of other Indo-Aryan languages. Following are some examples from the Bangla and Marathi.iv

Bangla
(22) aamaar ekta bon aachhe
    I-gen one sister be
    'I have a sister.'

(23) aamaar kaachhe gaaRi aachhe
    I-gen near car be
    'I have a car.'

Marathi
(24) Mala tin bhau ahet
    I-dat three brothers are
    'I have three brothers.'
(25) tyatSya dzawa/pasi adz paise ahet
     he-pos near today money-3pl.m. be-3pl
     'Today he has money.'

One therefore cannot turn away from the importance of the presence of a postposition in possessive structuring in some of these Indian languages. It is also equally necessary to find out what amongst so many other postpositions is so unique about the postposition 'near' that many languages chose to express alienability. It will be a good exercise to scan the language for other possessive or part-whole instances where it appears and understand the semantic contribution(s) it may make elsewhere.

We could start by noting that 'paas' is completely rejected for inalienable contexts. Consider the sentence from a popular Hindi movie for illustration.

(26) mere paas maa he
     I-gen near mother be
     'I have mother'

One could detect a certain alienable sense in the above structure, as in the almost implicit reduction of 'mother' to a commodity, on par with commodities like 'money', 'house' etc. But whether the change in meaning is brought about by the presence of the post-position or by a shift in our attention or cognition has to be looked into more carefully.

We find more examples of inalienable objects appearing with postpositions as in (27).

(27) John ke paas dimaag to he, par woh uskaa istemaal nahii kartaa
     John-gen near brain top be, but he that use not do
     John has the brains, but he does not use it'

Normally, the brain is taken as a part of the body and hence an inalienable possession of the person possessing it. The relation between a table and its legs would however be represented as in (28) and not as in (29). The only sensible way of interpreting (29) is that there are four legs lying next to the table.

(28) mez ke chaar paer he.
     Table-gen four legs be
(29) *Mezke paas chaar paer he.
     Table-gen near four legs be
     'Table has four legs.'

But with other body parts, as with one's brain, the presence of postposition 'paas' is fairly common (30)-(31):

(30) mere paas do haath to he, par kis kaamke?
     I-gen near two hands top. be, but what utility
     'I have two hands, but they are useless'
(31) Mere paas do aankhen to he, par kis kaamke?
     I-gen near two eyes top. be, but what utility
     'I have two eyes, but they are useless'
Notice even with part-whole relations, a little syntactic manipulation can change the picture. For instance it is hard to utter (32) without meaning that there are four tiers lying next to a car, but the addition of an universal quantifier allows us only the body-part relation meaning (33); similarly for tables and their legs (34).

(32) *gaaRike paas chaar pahiye he
car-gen near four wheels be
'The car has four wheels.'

(33) har gaaRike paas chaar pahiye (hote) he
every car-gen. near four wheels (become) be
'Every car has four wheels.'

(34) har mezke paas chaar paer (hote) he
every table-gen near four legs (become) be
'Every table has four wheels.'

A lesson that one probably could learn from this is that there is no prototypical schema for each and every possessive or part-whole relation we may have and languages do not certainly feel obliged to go strictly by these schemas. Alienable, inalienable and part-whole relations can all be expressed, in specific syntactic contexts, with the help of a postpositional marker. If it were the case that schemas decide our linguistic structures for us, we would have to trust our cognition to provide us with more consistent linguistic patterns than we actually discern in our natural languages. So what is the role of the postposition and how does its syntactic structuring relate to its semantic contribution?

4. Closing Down on 'Near'

Let us begin by investigating the postposition for 'near' and get a brief survey of the configurations where it appears, other than the possessive structures we have already discussed above. Consider (35):

(35) John-ke paas ek gaaRi khaRii he.
John-gen near one car park be
'John is standing near a car/There is car next to John.'

There is a very clear locational meaning for the postposition in (35): the car is 'located' or parked somewhere close to where 'John' is standing. There is no sense of possession in the structure, despite the presence of 'near'. There is moreover, no directional meaning that one can read into the structure, in direct contrast with the structures in (37)-(38) with postpositions such as piche 'behind', aage 'in front of', and baayen taraf 'to the left of'.

(36) John-ke piche ek gaaRi khaRii he
John-gen behind one car stand be
'There is a car parked behind John.'

(37) Johnke aage ek gaaRi khaRii he
John-gen in front one car stand be
'There is a car parked in front of John.'

(38) Johnke baayen taraf ek gaaRi khaRii he
John-gen left side one car stand be
'There is a car parked to the left of John.'
Note that the locational 'near' is symmetric as well, in the sense that if 'John is standing near the car' in (35), it also implies that 'the car is parked near John'. Similarly in (39), where we have two individuals ('John' and 'Mary') standing next to each other, expressed by virtue of this specific postposition.

(39) John ke paas Mary kharī he
       John-gen near Mary standing be
'Mary is standing next to John.'

Symmetry is a characteristic of some pre/postpositions, along with transitivity (as with pre/postpositions like 'inside'). That Hindi 'near' bearing the same characteristic only goes on to show that it is a true postposition. Similarly, modification (with 'very') is also possible with 'near' in (40). This again is a property of pre/postpositions in general, as illustrated in (41).

(40) John ke bahut paas ek gari/Mary kharī he
       John-gen very near one car/Mary stand be
'There is a car parked very close to John/Mary is standing very close to John.'

(41) John se das meter door ek gari kharī he
       John-abl ten meters far one car stand be
'There is car parked ten meters away from John.'

Zwarts (1997) assumes vector space as the underlying ontology of the compositional analysis of prepositional phrases. Prepositions are taken to denote relations between sets of points. However, since modifiers like 'ten meters' and 'diagonally' (as in 'ten meters behind the house', 'diagonally from the house') predicate over distance and direction (respectively), this information should also be part of the denotation of such prepositions. In more formal terms, the function that a locative preposition denotes should return entities with measurable distance and direction; entities that in Zwart's terminology, are vectors or directed line segments between points in 'space. In a vector space model, this denotes a set of vectors: roughly, the ones pointing outwards from the boundary of the house. Syntactic modification with measure phrases as 'ten meters' is intersective semantic modification. The intersection of the denotation of the measure phrase 'ten meters' with a set of vectors W gives us the subset of W containing only vectors that are ten meters long. Thus the expression 'ten meters outside the house' denotes the set of vectors pointing outwards from the house that are also ten meters long. A locative preposition therefore does not just denote relation between sets of points; rather it denotes a function that applies to the set of points where the reference object is located and returns a set of vectors.

For the postposition 'near' found in possessive constructions in Hindi, the above said explanation may not hold. For one, we fail to locate any symmetry in the relation it denotes. The sentence is (42) does not find its reverse in (43); i.e. we cannot say that if 'John has a car or a book', then the reverse (the car/the book has John) holds true as well.
(42)  Johnke paas ek gaaRii/kitaab he
    John-gen near one car/book be
    'John has a car/book.'

(43)  *ek gaaRii/kitaabke paas John he
    one car/book-gen near John be
    *'A car/book has John.'

Furthermore, unlike the postposition 'near', this particular item cannot be modified even by a degree phrase like 'very'. That is, the sentence in (44) cannot be taken to denote possession; it may however, be possible to impart it a locational reading: the car is standing very close to 'John'.

(44)  John ke bahut paas ek gaaRi he.
    John-gen very near one car   be
    'Very close to John there is a car.'

What we learn then, from the above examples, is that the possessive 'near' is not the same as the postposition or locational 'near'. It does not denote a location which is used to identify the T vis-a-vis the R and its dominion D. Instead, its presence seems to be an indication of a relation between two entities. It is a particle akin to the linkers (lk) found appearing between two objects of double object constructions in Bantu languages like Kinande (45). vii

(45)  Mo-n-a-h-ere omukali y'-eritunda
    aff-1S-T-give-Ext. woman.1. lk.1-fruit.5
    'I gave a fruit to a woman.'

Linkers are also found in sentences with two or more predicate-internal phrases, such as those in (46)-(47) depicting relations between a theme and a locative phrase, and between a theme and an instrumental phrase.

(46)  Omukali mo-a-gul-ire amatunda w’ omo-soko
    woman.1 aff-1S-Buy-Ext. fruits.6   Lk.6 Loc.18-market
    'The woman bought fruits in the market.'

(47)  Kambale mo-a-seny-i’ olukwi lw’ omo-mbasa.
    Kambale Aff-1S-T-chop-Ext wood.11   Lk.11 loc.18-axe.9
    'Kambale chopped wood with an axe.'

The possessive 'near' similarly links two noun phrases bringing them into a certain relation, in our case a possessor-possessee relation. Of course in this case, there is an additional thing to consider and that's the genitive case marker that appears on the possessor. Usually, in sentences with linkers, one finds them agreeing with the preceding NP, as we can witness in the following Kinande examples (48)-(49). That creates some confusion, since it is not the possessive 'near', but the genitive case that agrees with the preceding noun, as shown in (50)-(51).

(48)  Mo-n-a-h-ir-i’ okugulu k’- omo-kihuna
    aff-1S-T-put-Ext leg.15   Lk.15 Loc.18-hole.7
    'I put the leg in the hole.'

(49)  Mo-n-a-h-ir-i’ omo-kihuna m’- okugulu
    aff-1S-T-put-Ext Loc.18-hole.7 Lk.18 leg.15
    'I put the leg in the hole.'
(50) jaanwarkii aankhen
animal-gen-fem. eyes-fem.
'The eyes of the animal.'

(51) Johnkaa patra
'John's letter'

However, unlike Kinande linkers that cannot appear with pre/postpositions (52), genitive makers can appear with possessive postpositions as has been illustrated in many inalienable possessive constructions.

(52) Omukali mo-a-h-er-u-e eritunda (*ryo) na Kambale
woman.1 Aff-lS/T-give-Ext-Pass fruit.5 Lk.5 by Kambale
'The woman was given fruit by Kambale.'

And when genitive markers co-appear with postpositions, they can never trigger agreement, as we see in the following sentence (53).

(53) John ke paas ek gaaRii he.
John-gen.-def. near one car-fem. be
'John has a car.'

We take the lack of genitive agreement in the presence of the possessive 'near' to mean that both serve as linkers for the two nouns in the relation. When the particle is present, it does this job, which otherwise agreement serves. The two different representations given (54) and (55) try to capture the different ways in which the linker relation gets manifested in grammar.

(54) [TP [NP John-gen-fem] [NP gaaRii-fem] he]
(55) [TP [NPJohn-gen-def] [P pass] [NP gaaRii-fem] he]

In (54), with no particle 'near' in the structure, overt agreement is a possibility (owing to no intervention effects due to the particle), but it is also a necessity to link the two NPs together. In (55), on the other hand, with a particle present, the linking relation can be established via the particle itself.

5. Conclusion

Our primary purpose in writing this paper has been to show that cognitive schemas alone do not suffice to explain our linguistic structures. Instead, one must look at the individual units of our expressions to understand their contribution in the semantics of the entire phrase containing them. More specifically, we have tried to impress upon the readers that the mere presence of a postposition like element such as 'paas' in alienable possession does not guarantee that there is a locational meaning inbuilt into the ownership relation. This element may be simply a linker – having to do nothing with locational or directional meaning – establishing a relation between two NPs. The evidence presented in favor of our claim are a) the availability of the same in inalienable, body-part and whole relations which cannot be strictly 'locational', b) the absence of preposition like properties such as symmetricity, transitivity etc. with these linkers, and c) the commonalities between them and the linkers one finds in Bantu languages like Kinande.

In the end, we would like to note that a fruitful study of semantics is possible only when, in addition to a deeper understanding of the way our mind conceptualizes the world, we also take
into account the role of syntactic structures in meaning formation. Chomsky’s proposed framework for natural language has come under severe criticism for its focus on syntax and its off-handed treatment of semantics. However, if we are right, syntax cannot be completely sidelined while treating semantics. Possession may be conceptualized by humans in a certain way and humans may also differently cognize alienable and inalienable possession. But how discrete units come together and form different configurations are also vitally important for us before we get a handle on the “holy grail” linguistics: meaning.

NOTES
i. Examples from standard Hindi are considered here and the similarities and/or differences it may have with Urdu are left blurred for the purpose of this paper.
ii. Spanish examples are taken from Uriagereka (1998).
iii. Bantu examples are from Baker and Collins (2006).
iv. Examples are from Pandharipande (1997).

REFERENCES


